Formal models of argumentation have been investigated in several areas, from multi-agent systems and artificial intelligence (AI) to decision making, philosophy and law. In artificial intelligence, logic-based models have been the standard for the representation of argumentative reasoning. More recently, the standard logic-based models have been shown equivalent to standard connectionist models. This has created a new line of research where (i) neural networks can be used as a parallel computational model for argumentation and (ii) neural networks can be used (...) to combine argumentation, quantitative reasoning and statistical learning. At the same time, non-standard logic models of argumentation started to emerge. In this paper, we propose a connectionist cognitive model of argumentation that accounts for both standard and non-standard forms of argumentation. The model is shown to be an adequate framework for dealing with standard and non-standard argumentation, including joint-attacks, argument support, ordered attacks, disjunctive attacks, meta-level attacks, self-defeating attacks, argument accrual and uncertainty. We show that the neural cognitive approach offers an adequate way of modelling all of these different aspects of argumentation. We have applied the framework to the modelling of a public prosecution charging decision as part of a real legal decision making case study containing many of the above aspects of argumentation. The results show that the model can be a useful tool in the analysis of legal decision making, including the analysis of what-if questions and the analysis of alternative conclusions. The approach opens up two new perspectives in the short-term: the use of neural networks for computing prevailing arguments efficiently through the propagation in parallel of neuronal activations, and the use of the same networks to evolve the structure of the argumentation network through learning (e.g. to learn the strength of arguments from data). (shrink)

Humans are often extraordinary at performing practical reasoning. There are cases where the human computer, slow as it is, is faster than any artificial intelligence system. Are we faster because of the way we perceive knowledge as opposed to the way we represent it? -/- The authors address this question by presenting neural network models that integrate the two most fundamental phenomena of cognition: our ability to learn from experience, and our ability to reason from what has been learned. This (...) book is the first to offer a self-contained presentation of neural network models for a number of computer science logics, including modal, temporal, and epistemic logics. By using a graphical presentation, it explains neural networks through a sound neural-symbolic integration methodology, and it focuses on the benefits of integrating effective robust learning with expressive reasoning capabilities. -/- The book will be invaluable reading for academic researchers, graduate students, and senior undergraduates in computer science, artificial intelligence, machine learning, cognitive science and engineering. It will also be of interest to computational logicians, and professional specialists on applications of cognitive, hybrid and artificial intelligence systems. (shrink)

This book explores why, regarding practical reasoning, humans are sometimes still faster than artificial intelligence systems. It is the first to offer a self-contained presentation of neural network models for many computer science logics.

The target article criticises neural-symbolic systems as inadequate for analogical reasoning and proposes a model of analogy as transformation (i.e., learning). We accept the importance of learning, but we argue that, instead of conflicting, integrated reasoning and learning would model analogy much more adequately. In this new perspective, modern neural-symbolic systems become the natural candidates for modelling analogy.

Cette réaction est suscitée par l’article de Laurent Le Maux, récemment publié dans ce Journal. Le Maux affirme que Ludwig von Mises était le défenseur d’un système de réserves fractionnaires et un précurseur des économistes contemporains partisans des réserves fractionnaires. Nous critiquons la manière dont Le Maux utilise la littérature ancienne dans ce domaine, et nous montrons qu’il n’est pas suffisamment au fait des travaux de Mises et des problèmes qui divisent les défenseurs et les opposants du système de réserves (...) fractionnaires. Les écrits de Ludwig von Mises fournissent la preuve accablante qu’il était, et il le disait lui-même, un économiste qui développait l’approche de la Currency School dans le domaine des problèmes bancaires.This paper takes issue with an article by Laurent Le Maux that recently appeared in this journal. Le Maux claims that Ludwig von Mises was an advocate of fractional-reserve banking and a precursor of presentday economists defending fractional reserves. We criticise Le Maux’s treatment of previous literature in the field, and show that he is insufficiently acquainted with Mises’ work and with the problems that divide advocates and opponents of fractional reserves. Ludwig von Mises’ writings provide overwhelming evidence that he was, and saw himself as, an economist who developed the approach of the Currency School toward problems of banking. (shrink)

Cette réaction est suscitée par l’article de Laurent Le Maux, récemment publié dans ce Journal. Le Maux affirme que Ludwig von Mises était le défenseur d’un système de réserves fractionnaires et un précurseur des économistes contemporains partisans des réserves fractionnaires. Nous critiquons la manière dont Le Maux utilise la littérature ancienne dans ce domaine, et nous montrons qu’il n’est pas suffisamment au fait des travaux de Mises et des problèmes qui divisent les défenseurs et les opposants du système de réserves (...) fractionnaires. Les écrits de Ludwig von Mises fournissent la preuve accablante qu’il était, et il le disait lui-même, un économiste qui développait l’approche de la Currency School dans le domaine des problèmes bancaires.This paper takes issue with an article by Laurent Le Maux that recently appeared in this journal. Le Maux claims that Ludwig von Mises was an advocate of fractional-reserve banking and a precursor of presentday economists defending fractional reserves. We criticise Le Maux’s treatment of previous literature in the field, and show that he is insufficiently acquainted with Mises’ work and with the problems that divide advocates and opponents of fractional reserves. Ludwig von Mises’ writings provide overwhelming evidence that he was, and saw himself as, an economist who developed the approach of the Currency School toward problems of banking. (shrink)

Para um pensador que pensa poeticamente, como é o caso de Teixeira de Pascoaes, é natural que a verdade seja ela mesma pensada em íntima relação com a poesia. A verdade é, neste caso, identificada com verdade metafisica, ou o lado oculto do ser, e ontológica, ou o ser em desocultação. Inerente ao próprio prócesso do ser, o evento da verdade é o seu "aflorar na luz" a partir da sua obscuridade, ou o seu lembrar-se da Origem. Ele supõe, da (...) parte do homem, a capacidade de ouvir o "canto de silêncio" do ser ou o seu "Verbo originário". Tal capacidade é privilégio do poeta e o acesso a essa verdade aparece assim como privilégio ontológico da poesia. É assim porque a verdadeira poesia é a poesia saudosa. É pela saudade que o ser traz consigo a memória da Origem, uma memória que no poeta se torna verbo do Verbo, embora "verbo escuro". Compete àquele traduzi-lo em palavra humana, tornando-se o profeta do ser que lhe desvela o sentido, o seu donde e o seu para onde metafisicos. /// Pourunpenseurqui pensepoetiquement, comme Teixeira de Pascoaes, il est normal que la vérité soit elle-même pensée en intime rapport avec la poésie. En ce cas, la vérité est identifiée à une vérité métaphysique, c'est-à dire, à la face occulte de l'être, vérité qui est, en même temps une vérité ontologique, c'est-à-dire, l'être en désoccultation. Puisqu'il est inhérent au processus de l'être, l'événement de la vérité est son "effleurer dans la lumière" dès son obscurité, son "se souvenir" de l'Origine. Elle suppose, de la part de l'homme, la capacité d'écouter le "chant du silence" de l'être, en d'autrestermes, son Verbe originaire. Une telle capacité est privilége du poète et l'accès à cette vérité apparait par conséquent comme privilége ontologique de la poésie. La raison en est que la vraie poésie est la poésiesaudosa. C'estpar la saudade que l'être porte sursoi lamemoirede l'Origine, une mémoire qui devient, dans le poéte, verbe du Verbe, bien que "verbe obscur". Á lui le traduire en parole humaine, en devenant le prophéte de l'être, celui qui en dévoile le sens, son "d'oú" et son "vers ou" métaphysiques. /// For a thinker, thinking poetically, this is the case of Teixeira de Pascoaes, truth itself will be naturally thought in an intimate relation with poetry. Truth is, in this case, identical to metaphysical truth - the veiled side of being - and ontological truth - being in revelation. Inherent to the very proccess of being, truth's event is its "emerging to light" from the obscurity, or its remembrance of the Origin. This assumes the human capacity of listenning to being's "song of silence" or its "originary Word". This capacity is the poet's privilege and therefore the access to that truth turns up to be an ontological privilege of the poetry. Which may be so because the true poetry is a poetry of remembrance ("poesia saudosa"). Through the "saudade" the being brings with it the remembrance of the Origin, a remembrance that becomes, in the poet, word of the Word, although a "veiled" one ("verbo escuro". It is for the poet to translate it into human word, thus becoming the prophet of the being who unveils to him its meaning, its metaphysical "wherefrom" and "whereto". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:.. MERELY A MAN OF LETTERS" an interview with Jorge Luis Borges* Philosophy and Literature: Why don't you tell us about some of the philosophers who have influenced your work and in whom you have been the most interested? Jorge Luis Borges: Well, I think that's an easy one. You might talk in terms of two: Berkeley and Schopenhauer. But I suppose Hume might be (...) worked in also, because, after all, Hume refutes Berkeley. Really, he comes from Berkeley—even if Berkeley comes from Locke. You might think of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume as being three links in an argument..... But I suppose that when someone refutes someone else in philosophy, he is carrying on the argument. P&L: And Schopenhauer? Borges: Schopenhauer is very different from Hume. Of course, Schopenhauer had his idea of the Will. That is not to be found in Hume.... The case of Berkeley was different. I suppose he thought of God as being aware of all things all the time, if I don't get him wrong. If we go away, does this room disappear? No, because God is thinking about it. Now, in the case of Schopenhauer, I was rereading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, The World as Will and Idea, and I was rather taken aback, or baffled I should say, puzzled by something that keeps on recurring in Schopenhauer. Of course it may have been a slip of the pen, but as he goes back to it, and as he was a very careful writer, I wonder if it is a slip of the pen. For example, Schopenhauer begins by saying that the universe, the stars, the spaces in between, the planets, *On April 14, 1976, two editors of Philosophy and Literature, along with an interested colleague, interviewed Jorge Luis Borges at Michigan State University, where he held a position as visiting professor for the winter term. These remarks are edited from the transcript of that conversation. 337 338Philosophy and Literature this planet, those things, have no existence—except in the mind which perceives them. But then, to my surprise—and I suppose you can explain this to me, since you are philosophers and I am not—what Schopenhauer says is that all those things have no existence except in the brain. And that the universe—I remember these words, I don't think I'm inventing them now—"ist ein Gehirnphänomen," that the world is a cerebral phenomenon. Now, I was baffled. Because, of course, if you think of the universe, I suppose the brain is as much a part of the external world as the stars or the moon. The brain after all is a system of visual, of tactile, perceptions. He keeps on insisting on the brain. I don't think, for example, that Bishop Berkeley insists on the brain, or Hume, who would have insisted on the mind, consciousness. P&L: People sometimes say that they see Berkeley in stories like "Orbis Tertius." Borges: Yes, I suppose they do. Well, of course. But in that story I was led by literary means also. P&L: How do you distinguish the literary from the philosophical means in that story? Could you explain that? Borges: Very easily.... Encyclopedias have been my chief reading. I have always been interested in encyclopedias. I used to go to the Biblioteca National in Buenos Aires—and since I was so shy, I felt I could not cope with asking for a book, so I looked on the shelves for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I would pick up any chance volume and I would read it. One night I was richly rewarded, because I read all about the Druses, Dryden and the Druids—a treasure trove, no?—all in the same volume, "Dr-." Then I came to the idea of how fine it would be to think of an encyclopedia... a very rigorous one of course, of an imaginary world, where everything should be linked. For example, you would have a language and then a literature, and then a history and so on. Then I thought I would write a story of a fancy encyclopedia. Of course that would require many different people to write it... (shrink)

Scholars still struggle to characterize, evaluate, and understand the mesmerizing prose pieces of Ficciones that raised Jorge Luis Borges to the first ranks of literary fame. Speaking to Philosophy and Literature, Borges once described his work as "the fiction of philosophy," and the two prologues he wrote for Ficciones leave enticing clues about what this means in practice. I argue that these long-neglected prologues open critical space for Ficciones, slyly mocking three idols of literary cant: that genre informs (...) a work, that epic tomes best represent the real, and that great authors write unprecedented books. Borges knew better. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Acosta, José de (1539–1600) Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1810–84) Bello, Andrés (1781–1865) Bilbao, Francisco (1823–65) Bolkvar, Simón (1783–1830) Casas, Bartolomé de las (1484–1566) Caso, Antonio (1883–1946) Cruz, Sor Juana Inés de la (1651–95) da Costa, Newton Carneiro Affonso (b. 1929) Dussel, Enrique (b. 1934) Frondizi, Risieri (1910–83) Gaos, José (1900–69) González Prada, Manuel (1848–1918) Gracia, Jorge J. E. (b. 1942) Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979) Hostos, Eugenio Marka de (1839–1903) Ingenieros, José (1877–1925) Korn, (...) Alejandro (1860–1936) Lastarria, José Victorino (1817–88) Lemos, Miguel (1854–1917) Mariátegui, José Carlos (1895–1930) Martk, José (1853–95) Méndez Sierra, Justo (1848–1912) Mora, José Maria Luis (1794–1850) Miró Quesada, Francisco (b. 1918) Rabossi, Eduardo (1930–2005) Ramos, Samuel (1897–1959) Rodó, José Enrique (1872–1917) Romero, Francisco (1891–1962) Sahagún, Fray Bernardino de (1499–1590) Salazar Bondy, Augusto (1925–74) Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino (1811–88) Ofelia Schutte (b. 1945) Sepslveda, Juan Ginés de (ca. 1494–1573) Torretti, Roberto (b. 1930) Vasconcelos, José (1882–1959) Vaz Ferreira, Carlos (1872–1958) Villoro, Luis (b. 1922) Vitoria, Francisco de (ca. 1483–1546) Zea Aguilar, Leopoldo (1912–2004) Acknowledgment Further Reading. (shrink)

Este artículo busca demostrar que, a partir de los lineamientos presentes en el capítulo II del reciente _Reprise du donné_ es posible proponer cuatro niveles de hermenéutica que nos permiten resolver algunos de los problemas de la fenomenología marioniana lúcidamente planteados por Christina Gschwandtner.

Resumen Me propongo aclarar la noción de “fenómeno” de Jean-Luc Marion y su relación con la categoría de “fenómeno saturado”. Para ello discutiré las interpretaciones de algunos comentaristas que advierten tensiones entre la primera y la segunda tópica del fenómeno.I aim to clarify Jean-Luc Marion’s notion of “phenomenon” and its relationship with the category of “saturated phenomenon”. To this end I discuss the interpretations of some commentators who point out tensions between the first and the second topic of the phenomenon (...) presented. (shrink)

This vision of universal solidarity, Nobo demonstrates, is the fundamental metaphysical thesis whose truth the categories and principles of Whitehead's philosophy were expressly designed to elucidate.

La llamada _nouvelle phénoménologie_ ¿practica efectivamente una fenomenología? Este artículo se propone demostrar, a partir de un análisis de las propuestas de sus dos autores más representativos: Jean-Luc Marion y Claude Romano, que las obras de estos filósofos constituyen una auténtica fenomenología si se tiene en cuenta el particular estatuto que le otorgan a la instancia antepredicativa.

¿Cuál es el estatuto de la reducción en la obra de Marion? Este artículo se propone aclarar esta operación fundamental en la fenomenología de la donación estableciendo su relación con la epoché entendida heideggerianamente como tonalidad afectiva fundamental.

Abduction is or subsumes a process of inference. It entertains possible hypotheses and it chooses hypotheses for further scrutiny. There is a large literature on various aspects of non-symbolic, subconscious abduction. There is also a very active research community working on the symbolic (logical) characterisation of abduction, which typically treats it as a form of hypothetico-deductive reasoning. In this paper we start to bridge the gap between the symbolic and sub-symbolic approaches to abduction. We are interested in benefiting from developments (...) made by each community. In particular, we are interested in the ability of non-symbolic systems (neural networks) to learn from experience using efficient algorithms and to perform massively parallel computations of alternative abductive explanations. At the same time, we would like to benefit from the rigour and semantic clarity of symbolic logic. We present two approaches to dealing with abduction in neural networks. One of them uses Connectionist Modal Logic and a translation of Horn clauses into modal clauses to come up with a neural network ensemble that computes abductive explanations in a top-down fashion. The other combines neural-symbolic systems and abductive logic programming and proposes a neural architecture which performs a more systematic, bottom-up computation of alternative abductive explanations. Both approaches employ standard neural network architectures which are already known to be highly effective in practical learning applications. Differently from previous work in the area, our aim is to promote the integration of reasoning and learning in a way that the neural network provides the machinery for cognitive computation, inductive learning and hypothetical reasoning, while logic provides the rigour and explanation capability to the systems, facilitating the interaction with the outside world. Although it is left as future work to determine whether the structure of one of the proposed approaches is more amenable to learning than the other, we hope to have contributed to the development of the area by approaching it from the perspective of symbolic and sub-symbolic integration. (shrink)

You see, I'm not really a thinker. I am a literary man and I have done my best to use the literary possibilities of philosophy, although I'm not a philosopher myself, except in the sense of being very puzzled with the world and with my own life. But when people ask me, for example, if I really believe that the cosmic process will go on and will repeat itself, I say I have nothing at all to do with that. I (...) merely tried to apply the aesthetic possibilities, let's say, of the transmigration of souls or of the fourth dimension to literature and see what could result from them. But really, I would not think of myself as a thinker or a philosopher. And I follow no particular school. (shrink)

In the year 1855, American Literature made two experiments. The first, quite a minor one, the blending of finished music with sing-song and Red Indian folklore, was undertaken by a considerable poet and a fine scholar, Longfellow. The name of it, Hiawatha. I suppose it succeeded, as far as the expectations of the writer and of his readers went. Nowadays, I suppose it lingers on in the memory of childhood and survives him. Now the other is, of course, Leaves of (...) Grass. Leaves of Grass is a major experiment. In fact, I think I can safely venture to say that Leaves of Grass is one of the most important events in the history of literature. If I speak of it as an experiment, perhaps you will think that I am implying a profanation, a desecration, and a blasphemy, since, when we speak of experiments in literature, we generally think of unsuccessful ones. For example, when we speak of experimental literature, well, we think of works that we do our best to admire and that somehow defeat us because, after all, the word "experiment" is a polite word. Well, in the case of Leaves of Grass the experiment succeeded so splendidly that we think it could never have failed. Somehow when something goes right - and that hardly ever happens in literature - we think it somehow inevitable. We think that Leaves of Grass lay there, lay unsuspected there, ready for anybody to discover and write it down. (shrink)

El objetivo que dirige este artículo es esbozar el modo en que, desde la filosofía para niños, es pensable un ejercicio crítico de la identidad y, a partir de ello, promover una revitalización del mundo político, entendido desde el concepto arendtiano de acción. Revelar los marcos referenciales y, una vez puestos de relieve, someterlos a una crítica dialógica, comunitaria, supone la posibilidad ―quizás utópica― de proyectar desde la niñez y construir a futuro un mundo digno de ser vivido. La metodología (...) utilizada es cualitativa, de corte hermenéutico. En el primer apartado se desglosa el concepto tayloriano de identidad en su vínculo con los marcos referenciales y la idea de bien. En el segundo acápite nos concentramos en el doble concepto arendtiano de mundo, como mundo circundante y como trama política. Finalmente, y tomando como punto de partida los análisis de Lipman, se esboza el carácter político de la filosofía para niños, entendiendo aquí lo político con Hannah Arendt. (shrink)